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Introduction

How is it that some social movements are able to affect policy change while others are
not? In this project, I conduct a comparative case-study that compares the ability of social
movements and interest groups to affect policy change. While numerous studies have been
conducted that treat public opinion as the independent variable in relation to foreign policy, i.e.
whether it influences decision-making, there is considerably less attention paid toward public
opinion as a dependent variable in the literature. 1 Additionally, sociologists have only recently
begun to interrogate social movements as political phenomena. In the past twenty years,
especially, sociologists studying social movements have shifted their focus from the sociopsychological pathologization of individual protesters toward utilizing political process theory,
otherwise known as political opportunity theory, to examine the behavior of social movement
organizations (SMOs) as institutional actors within civil society attempting to penetrate the
political public sphere. Political opportunity theory involves the determination of the “event[s] or
broad social process that serve to undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the
political establishment is structured.”2 In this project, I identify political opportunity as the
ability to achieve salience in public discourse. To do so, I examine networks of communication
as maps of the processes by which actors attempt to achieve dominance. I therefore demonstrate
the more specific implications of achieving agency over the narrative of conflict in society.

1

Kathleen McGraw. “Manipulating Public Opinion.” In Understanding Public Opinion.
2 Edition
2
Doug McAdam. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970
nd
2 ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 41.
nd
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Structural inequalities are shown to directly influence the manifestation of discourse in the public
sphere, and thus the direction of public opinion.
Securitization theory comprises the overarching framework for this project, where
analysis is based upon the characterization of securitization abroad, where the goal is to convince
so-called “islands of civic engagement” to mobilize on behalf of others implicated in conflict.
These islands take the form of SMOs and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) fighting to
invoke international law in order to condemn the entities in question through foreign policy.
Therefore, the analysis done in this project will involve the process by which conflict narratives
become dominant in society. In the case of the anti-apartheid movement, analysis will be
focused on the South African lobbying effort in the U.S. and its ultimate failure to prevent the
U.S. from imposing sanctions. In the case of the pro-Palestinian movement, analysis will be
focused on the ways in which the U.S. and Israel’s close military, cultural and ideological ties
have shaped public discourse and has led toward a spiral of silence regarding Israel’s
controversial security policy.
While this project may ultimately illuminate the structural obstacles faced by the proPalestinian movement in the U.S., its ultimate value does not lie in its ability to prescribe specific
policy solutions. Rather, the effect of this project should be to emphasize the ways in which
sociology can inform political science research in an increasingly globalized world that defies
the traditional realist conception of an anarchic international system.

4

Chapter One: Securitization Theory

This project involves two relatively recent developments in social science: securitization
theory within international relations (IR), and social movement theory, within sociology. In this
first chapter, I discuss the significance of the relationship between competing iterations of
securitization theory—the Copenhagen School’s approach on one hand, and the Welsh School’s
approach on the other. The analytical framework provided by the Copenhagen School guides the
comparative case-study I conduct in this project, which involves the dilemma of treating civil
society movements as securitizing actors in the analysis of securitization processes in the modern
era. Within that analytical framework, the sociological theory of Jürgen Habermas illustrates the
role of communication networks in producing securitizing discourse in society. The
phenomenon Elisabeth Noelle-Nuemann defines as the spiral of silence occurs as a result of the
processes that Habermas identifies within communication networks. In regards to the competing
schools of securitization theory, I contend that the Welsh School approach does exactly what it
falsely claims the Copenhagen School does—it relies upon a realist conception of international
politics, and instead of holistically analyzing securitizing processes in a constructivist fashion, as
does the Copenhagen School, it promotes the escalation of issues into a more dangerous zone of
politics, just for the sake of the urgency implied. While I disagree with the Welsh School’s
emancipatory view of securitization, I nonetheless recognize that it characterizes the way in
which various secessionist groups around the world have chosen to fight for their independence.
Therefore, I argue that the normative Welsh School approach must not necessarily represent the
sole international relations lens by which we address civil society movements today; because as
innovation in communication technology continues to foster an increasingly globalized civil
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society, it will only become more likely that the number of instances of successful emancipatory
securitizations will rise. Acknowledging the realist conception of international politics
inseparable from the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework, how can securitizing
processes of civil society movements be analyzed if there is no parallel framework in IR theory
through which to fairly compare them with traditional securitizing actors? The solution I
propose in this project that will facilitate the analysis of securitizations initiated by non-state
actors is the application of the latest framework of social movement theory that recognizes the
reality that sociologists no longer treat social movements as riots to be suppressed and prevented,
but instead acknowledge their potential to compete on the international stage. Furthermore, a
better understanding of the construction of threats in sociological terms reduces the ambiguity
state leaders face when dealing with societal threats.

Applying the Copenhagen School’s Framework for Analysis
In each case examined in this project, there are two competing securitizing actors. The
first securitizing actor is the mainstream institutional aspect, which acts in opposition toward the
second securitizing actor, the social movement. In Chapter Three, I compare the securitizing
actors of the mainstream institutional aspects of each case: on one hand, the U.S. pro-Israel lobby
and its successful securitization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, on the other, the status quo of
U.S.-South African relations and its ultimate failure to withstand the force of the U.S. antiapartheid movement. Then, I compare the securitizing actors of the civil society movements of
each case: the failure of the U.S. pro-Palestinian movement in comparison to the ultimate success
of the U.S. anti-apartheid movement.
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Next to consider is the identification of the precise threats alleged in each case. With the
Copenhagen School’s securitization theory, successful securitization boils down to whether or
not the audience considers the alleged threat existential. In the case of the pro-Israel lobby’s
dominance over the pro-Palestinian movement in American public discourse, the pro-Israel
lobby implicates the pro-Palestinian movement (depending on the specific entity being analyzed)
as posing either a) a societal threat; b) an intentional political threat; or c) a structural political
threat to the referent object of security of which, above all, is Israel’s existence as a Jewish state.
To be sure, the mission of the pro-Israel lobby prioritizes the U.S. – Israel relationship in
general; however, it is the particular referent object of Israel’s existence as a Jewish state that
makes the securitization resonate. Thus, in Chapter Three I discuss the nature of the
communication network that makes this securitization possible. Then, considered in a parallel
way, is the case of the status quo of U.S. – South Africa relations and the anti-apartheid
movement. Ultimately the U.S. was unable to successfully securitize its economic interest in
South Africa because it would have been impossible to convincingly characterize such an
economic “threat” in existential terms to Congress and the American people. Thus, even though
it took years of steady coalition building, the anti-apartheid movement was able to successfully
securitize the societal threat faced by the black population in South Africa. Furthermore, the
apartheid regime failed to characterize the black population as an existential threat worth
securitizing because the international community witnessed the atrocities committed by the
apartheid regime via media coverage of the escalating conflict throughout the second half of the
twentieth century.
Then, I compare the civil society movements of each case and their attempts to
securitize their respective situations. For the case of the pro-Palestinian movement, I discuss the
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ways in which the emancipatory view of securitization exhibited by certain elements of the
movement only serve to undermine the movement, because it legitimizes the pro-Israel lobby’s
securitization of Palestinians. The existential threat of the pro-Palestinian movement against the
U.S. pro-Israel lobby can be described in several ways in terms of Buzan’s five sectors of
security, depending on the entity within the movement being analyzed. All proposed solutions
entertained by the pro-Palestinian movement represent either an intentional or structural political
or societal threat, which can either be internal (i.e. Palestinian citizens of Israel) or external (e.g.
Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza; foreigners mobilized by international civil
society movement). The intensity of the threat is the variable which gives the pro-Israel lobby’s
message its salience, which I will explore by examining the ways in which the Israeli
communication networks relay to the U.S., and how that becomes part of the U.S.
communication network.
Both the processes by which audiences agree upon the securitization of a referent object
of security as well as the effects of securitization are what I will be analyzing in the final two
chapters of this project. In Chapter Three, the comparison of the mainstream institutional aspects
of each case will predictably reveal that the lack of any institutionalized lobbying effort was one
of the main factors that allowed for the anti-apartheid movement to eventually gain traction.
Then, a comparison of the civil society movements of each case will reveal that, in addition to
the factor of institutionalized lobbying, the degree to which each case embraced (whether
intentionally or otherwise) an emancipatory view of securitization determined (or continues to
determine) the outcome of these movements.
I devote the first part of this chapter to a discussion of the basis for the Copenhagen
School’s framework for analysis, as articulated by securitization scholars that notice the
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unparallel nature of critical securitization theory due to its being based on a misinterpretation of
Buzan and Wæver’s non-normative securitization theory. Furthermore, I discuss the arguments
relevant to the issues characteristic of the case-studies I examine in this project, focusing
particularly on the discursive legitimation process of securitization and the theory of
communicative action it invokes. Additionally, I discuss ways in which the Welsh School
approach to securitization is flawed and potentially detrimental toward the attempt of
marginalized people to achieve their emancipatory goals.
Finally, I deconstruct the elements of the Copenhagen School’s definition of
securitization as the process by which “an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a
political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object. . .
enabling a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat.”3 First is how each
school identifies referent objects of security. For the Copenhagen School, referent objects of
security are typically the states. For the Welsh School, the referent object of security is the
individual. Next is how each school treats security threats—how they are defined, and what
constitutes a security threat. The Copenhagen School does not specifically seek to label things
“security threats.” Instead, it analyzes instances of securitization, where the reality is that for
securitization to occur in the first place, issues must be commonly perceived by the relevant
audience as imminent existential threats. Alternatively, the Welsh School views any kind of
injustice being perpetrated against a group as capable of being securitized.

Defining Security

3

Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International
Security. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 491.
9

International relations (IR) scholar Barry Buzan, of the constructivist, English School of
IR theory, initiated the sub-field of security studies as we know it today with his 1983 book
People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations.4 Barry
Buzan, alongside Danish IR scholars Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde are the foremost thinkers
within the Copenhagen School of security studies. In 1998, they published their book Security:
A New Framework for Analysis.5 Critical theorists Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, also
aligned with the English School, but with the underdeveloped “World Society” conception of
international politics, represent the primary voices of the Welsh School. While the Copenhagen
School considers securitization theory to serve an analytical purpose, the critical theorists of the
Welsh School assert that the purpose of securitization theory ought to be to challenge the status
quo of security in global politics, which they argue will continue to marginalize and subjugate
people if security studies scholars do not actively pursue a mission to prioritize “human security”
over state security.6
The Copenhagen School originally defined security as a “speech act” that, when
“utter[ed]… by a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and
thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.”7 Indeed, “as a
speech act, securitization is located with the realm of political argument and discursive
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Barry Buzan. People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International
Relations. (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, 1983)
5
Buzan et al. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1998).
6
Ken Booth. "Security and Emancipation." Review of International Studies. 17, no. 4
(October 1991): 313-26.
7
Ole Wæver. “Securitization and Desecuritization.” In On Security, 1-31. ed. Ronnie
Lipschutz. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). PDF. Columbia International Affairs
Online, Transcribed, proofread, and marked up in HTML, April 1998.

10

legitimation,”8 so thus it subjects security practices “to criticism and transformation.”9 However,
the ambiguity of this definition, that somehow the speech-act itself “does” security, has proven to
be misleading. Some scholars feel it limits the analytical scope of the theory such that it only
covers traditional military engagements where war is formally declared. Scholars like Matt
McDonald have struggled with this, who suggests that “a range of issues or dynamics are
mentioned but underspecified in the securitization framework, most prominently the context of
the speech act . . . suggest[ing] that dynamics such as the role of ‘facilitating conditions’ and the
‘audience’ are so undertheorized as to ultimately remain outside the framework itself.”10 Over
the years, several scholars have contributed toward the effort to address the gaps in the theory.
For example, I refer to Michael C. Williams, who addresses the most common critiques of the
Copenhagen School.
Firstly, Williams explains the Copenhagen School’s theory in the context of Carl
Schmitt’s “concept of the political”, which Schmitt conceives is the way in which we relate to
issues, which at its most extreme is characterized as the tension between friend and enemy and
the recognition of the potential for that tension to escalate into mortal conflict to protect a
referent object.11 This helps explain the Copenhagen School’s focus upon a realist view of
international politics. According to Schmitt, sovereignty is necessary in order to make the
decision to securitize an issue, which is dependent upon the support it receives from a group
united by a common political view, or in other words, the aforementioned recognition of the
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Michael C. Williams. “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International
Politics.” International Studies Quarterly. 47, no. 4 (2003): 511-31. 512.
9
Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies,” 512.
10
Matt McDonald. “Securitization and the Construction of Security” European Journal
of International Relations. 14, no. 4 (2008): 563-587.
11
Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies,” 515.
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potentially violent tension between friend and enemy.12 Thus, in the absence of this friend vs.
enemy mentality, securitization is not possible. Scholar Stefano Guzzini notes that the
Copenhagen School’s approach to securitization thus leaves “a subjectivist concept of security
behind, where security is whatever significant actors may regard as such,”13 which is not as
ambiguous a conclusion as it may appear, considering the dynamic necessary for securitization
defined above. So, it is nearly impossible under this view of securitization to operate according
to the Welsh School’s theory. For example, there is nothing “political” about securitizing
economic issues, due to the inevitably risky realm of global markets. It is nearly impossible to
precisely determine which specific transactions may have resulted in the disparagement of a
population. For, risk is inseparable from the economy, so it is nearly impossible to determine
with certainty whether actors made economic moves out of aggression or not. One exception to
the rule, however, is the issue of societal security, the debate around which I will address in my
discussion of existential threats later in this chapter.
With Schmitt’s concept of the political in mind, therefore, the Copenhagen School
discourages securitization at all costs due not only to its implication of deadly violence, but also
because it bypasses deliberative processes that help politicians design better policy. After all, the
issues that critical theorists wish to see securitized require long-term solutions, the consequences
of which ought to be thoroughly considered before any law is passed. The Copenhagen School
thus promotes “desecuritization” (i.e. a return of the issue to the realm of normal politics) as

12

Ibid., 518.
Stefano Guzzini. “Securitization as a causal mechanism.” Security Dialogue. 42, no. 45 (2011): 329-341. 330
13
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much as possible.14 The preferred state, then, is “asecurity” where international relations are so
institutionalized that the likelihood of a re-securitization is minimized.15

The Referent Object of Security
The Copenhagen School specifically refers to states and societies rather than individuals
because it acknowledges that the state system came to exist primarily as a sacrifice of liberty on
the part of the individual in exchange for protection against threats. 16 Ken Booth argues that
individuals ought to be the ultimate referent of security, because states are “unreliable as primary
referents because whereas some are in the business of security (internal and external) some are
not.” 17 Furthermore, Booth claims that “it is illogical to privilege the security of the means as
opposed to the security of the ends.”18 While the conciseness of this argument is appealing, at
closer observation it does not make sense, even barring the fact that it falsely implicates the
Copenhagen School. Indeed, “ultimately,” individuals are the referent object of security, and the
Copenhagen School realizes this. Buzan acknowledges in People, States and Fear the “paradox”
of national security in the context of the state system, that the state can only provide individual
security by imposing threats.19 Despite this, the state system emerged for a reason – individuals
are likely incapable of defending themselves against any existential threat they may encounter in
their lifetime, so they sacrifice personal liberty for the collective security the state provides.
Buzan furthermore admits that a minimal, Lockean state is ideal; however, it is an unfortunate

14

Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization”
Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies,” 524.
16
Buzan, People, States and Fear, 20.
17
Booth, “Security and Emancipation,” 319.
18
Ibid., 320.
19
Buzan, People, States and Fear, 20.
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reality that most states operate according to a maximal view of the state, that it is “considerably
more than the sum of its parts, or something different from them,”20 and therefore sacrifices the
liberty of individuals to pursue causes unrelated to serving the collective good. In the view of
scholars aligned with the logic behind the Copenhagen School such as Guzzini, it is missing the
point of securitization theory to attempt to make normative judgements on particular decisions to
securitize threats because “the analysis of security is about not what security means but what
security ‘does’.”21 Therefore, any normative securitization theory would make it so that any
instance of violence could be theoretically be justified. It is thus considered more worthwhile to
analyze the processes of securitization, looking at the sociology of how meaning is socially
produced22 so as to better a goal common to both approaches to securitization: to understand the
systems that perpetuate injustice. 23

Identifying Security Threats
An individual unfamiliar with security studies may be easily convinced by the Welsh
School approach to securitization theory, which conceives of securitization as an emancipatory
mechanism. Along those lines, that same individual could be expected to assume that the role of
a security analyst is to serve as a helpful reference for leaders who need to (re)prioritize their
governing agendas. In order to fulfill such a role, one may accordingly presume that a security
analyst maintain a vision of what issues are considered security threats. According to the
Copenhagen School’s securitization theory, this imagination of what a security analyst does is

20

Ibid., 22.
Guzzini, “Securitization as a Causal Mechanism,” 330.
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Ibid., 332.
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Booth, “Security and Emancipation,” 322.
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actually backwards. The Copenhagen School theory does not particularly seek to label things as
security threats, because by its logic, nothing is intrinsically a security threat. Rather, a security
analyst following the Copenhagen School’s definition of securitization analyzes the conditions
under which the distinct political phenomenon of securitization occurs. Thus, if a situation does
not fit that framework, there is no securitization to be analyzed.
Wæver defines security threats as “developments that threaten the sovereignty or
independence of a state in a particularly rapid or dramatic fashion, and deprive it of the capacity
to manage by itself.”24 Therefore, security threats require in response a “mobilization of the
maximum effort.”25 Moreover, Copenhagen School theorists believe that the decision of a
securitizing actor to speak security on an issue ought to be considered a last resort; for,
securitization entails negative consequences that must be weighed relative to the imminence of
the threat. To be sure, this is not to say that the Copenhagen School considers non-existential
threats a lower priority than securitized issues; rather, it is to say that it is futile to attempt to
appropriate language typically evocative of a sense of danger and/or urgency when the issue in
question is clearly not existential, nor even imminently existential. For, securitization most often
has the result of developing policy that, while it may diffuse a threat in the short term, is not
meant to do so in the long term, because it is unlikely that long-term solutions drawn up quickly
and without consideration are going to end up being sound policy decisions. Therefore,
desecuritization should be pursued whenever possible, and securitization should be avoided at all
costs, and only considered a viable option when the vast majority of the audience is convinced
that anything short of immediate action to address a given threat places the referent object of

24
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Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 6.
Ibid.
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security at undue risk for annihilation. When there is an option besides violence or even the
threat of violence, the other option should be pursued. The only threats where it is appropriate to
securitize are effectively existential threats because they are the only instances in which urgent
decision-making is necessary and the resulting contingencies would amount to far less of a
negative impact than failure to address the problem altogether. Once the threat is addressed,
following the Copenhagen School’s logic, executive decision-making ought to return to being
checked by the institutionalized political processes of the state governmental apparatus.
Accordingly, the Copenhagen School is said to represent a combination of neorealist and
constructivist approaches to international relations analysis.
The Copenhagen School identifies five “sectors” potentially susceptible to security
threats: military, political, economic, ecological and societal.26 Buzan also identifies variables
affecting threats in terms of their source (internal or external), intensity (physical range, temporal
range and probability) and historical change (of threats in character over time).27

Existential Security Threats
While the Copenhagen School does not define the specific characteristics of security
threats it considers legitimate, nor does it seek to, the types of threats its securitization theory
analyzes are always widely considered to be unambiguously existential. Likewise, the threats the
Copenhagen School normally treats have to do with the military, political, and societal sectors,
for, they not only threaten every aspect of the state, but they use force in a way that “threaten[s]
to overthrow a self-created rule by consent, and replace it with an imposed rule by coercion.”28

26

Buzan et al, Security, 7.
Buzan, People, States and Fear, 83.
28
Ibid., 75.
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With military security threats, the referent object of security is the physical integrity of the state.
When it comes to political security threats, the referent object of security instead is the
legitimacy as well as the ideological constitution of a state. These threats can either occur as
intentionally or inevitably due to structural conflicts of interest.29 Buzan cites the case of the
decision of the U.S. to formally condemn the South African apartheid regime as an example of
the U.S. exacting an intentional political threat. Eventually, as it became increasingly politically
untenable to remain neutral in regards to the human rights abuses perpetrated by the apartheid
regime, the U.S. imposed sanctions on South Africa, in order to increase the inevitability of
political reform.
Structural threats, on the other hand, are those that arise due to specific circumstances, or
in other words, “when the organising principles of two states cannot simply ignore each other’s
existence. . . thus play[ing] a zero-sum game with each other whether they will it or not.”30
Buzan cites the the territorial conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, where Muslims
represent a demographic majority, as an example of a stalemate caused by structural political
threats. While Pakistan’s primary raison d’etre is its distinctly Islamic identity, when it comes to
India, the stability of its secular government depends on the maintenance of tolerance among its
population comprised of numerous distinct cultures, not to mention sixty million Muslims.
With societal threats, the referent object of security is identity. When identity is
threatened, the existential fear is that “[the identity] will no longer be able to live as itself”.31
Wæver warns that when societal security is approached from a state-centric perspective, things

29

Ibid., 78.
Ibid.
31
Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 15.
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get dangerous—either the state will feel threatened by elements of society, or the state might feel
threatened by a strengthened state-less nationality within the state.32 Societal threats are
especially difficult to reconcile because, due to the fact that the securitizing actor is not operating
under a recognizable framework, the threatened state often has no choice but to prepare for the
worst-case scenario, which inevitably escalates the securitization into even more dangerous
territory. Critical theorist Bill McSweeney criticizes the study of societal security because, to his
mind, it “produces a falsely objectified understanding of social identity that risks supporting—or
at least not opposing—the rise of intolerant, exclusionary identities, that make conflicts more
likely.”33

Non-Existential Security Threats
It is simply the nature of some sectors of society that makes it nearly impossible to
identify the instances in which threats cannot be managed via normal means—such is the case
with economic security threats. Most of the time, economic security threats can only be
recognized in hindsight. To identify economic threats is a much more ambiguous task than it is
to identify political or economic ones “because the normal condition of actors in the economic
domain is one of risk, competition and uncertainty.”34 “If one cannot determine the normal
condition of something, it is hard to calculate what actions might pose threats to it.”35 Economic
downturns are also rarely viewed in terms of national security. Exceptions to this are the

32
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“traditional link between economic factors and military capability,”36 as well as “economic
threats to domestic stability.”37 The latter is of particular interest to the Welsh School, as it
advocates for the emancipation of those societies that pursue economic policies that render them
increasingly dependent on trade, finding themselves locked “into a position of permanent
economic disadvantage, so preventing them from solving the numerous problems which make
them weak.”38 Finally, natural disasters and the factors that contribute to them are considered
ecological threats to national security by some in the field. Buzan suggests that issues like
climate change ought to be relegated to international bodies, instead of being litigated at the state
level.39
In the next chapter, I discuss the competing definitions of global civil society, a debate
surrounding the concept of Global Civil Society in scholarship social movement theory in the
context of securitization theory, indicating where it fills in the gaps associated with non-state
actors becoming real threats. I will also discuss the evolution of social movement theory from its
earliest conception as simply a means to explain why social movements occur, toward how it is
used today as a means to study how social movements arise. *

36
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Chapter Two: Discourse Theory and Social Movement Theory
In the previous chapter, I provided a look into the basic logic of securitization theory, as
well as an illustration of its framework for analysis as it applies to the comparative case-study
central to this project. While the theory may provide an understanding of the characteristic
political dynamics that occur when issues are securitized, it nonetheless lacks the specificity to
explicitly account for the processes that we now acknowledge to occur at the state level as well
as the local and meso-levels of analysis in cases of securitization. To my mind, that
securitization theory is limited in its analytical scope is entirely acceptable, and does not serve to
discount the value of the theory—it is simply an indication of different levels of analysis.
Arguably, this ought not to be considered a weakness to be remedied in future attempts to
develop comprehensive analytical frameworks; especially when there are analogous social
science theories available that would address the level of analysis issue. Therefore, it makes
sense to let the securitization account for the essential structure of the framework, letting
sociological theory account for the processes that cause a characteristically securitized situation.
Because this case-study deals with the interaction between social movements, interest groups and
public discourse, I have chosen to utilize social movement theory and Habermas’s
communication model in my analysis. Social movement theory has developed to the point where
researchers have shifted their focus from pathologizing the individual toward examining
organizations and their interaction between the public sphere and the political public sphere.
studies empirically observable political processes, making it consistent with the Copenhagen
School’s framework for analysis. The theories are, in essence, analogous; for, just as social
movements must convince people to join their cause, securitizing actors must convince relevant
audiences that their issues merit departure from the realm of normal politics. In other words,
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both securitization theory and social movement theory address the processes by which “values,
interests and ideas”40 turn into action; where such processes involve how organizational
networks successfully construct meaning in society and perpetuate collective action. In regards
to this project’s analysis of interest groups, while there is no shortage of interest group
scholarship, currently there is no distinctive theory that would necessarily satisfy the goal of this
project to identify the mechanisms that determine the fate of social movements. Fortunately,
however, interest group scholars have shifted their focus in recent years, finding social
movement theory to facilitate more substantive research, thanks to its emphasis on the effect of
political processes on institutionalizing behavior.41
In this chapter, I establish a basic overview of the sociological theories and concepts
providing the means for comparison in this project. First, I discuss the use of the term global
civil society, particularly in regards to its role in reinforcing a North/South paternalism. Next, I
indicate the way in which social movement theory can be thought to exist according to the
fundamental concepts related to Habermas’s communication model, showing how framing issues
involving discourse in this way can help make sense of the effects of the interplay between the
public sphere, political public sphere and the media. Furthermore, I define German scholar
Elisabeth Noelle Neumann’s concept of the spiral of silence, which I argue is the result of
rendered in American public discourse as a result of the dominant Israeli narrative in the U.S.
which appeals to a wide array of constituencies. Then, I discuss the evolution of social
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movement theory and how its currently predominant incarnation as political opportunity theory
enables the analysis of political science issues that require more specific sociologically motivated
research. Finally, I apply the theory to the two cases and indicate the format of the following
two chapters.
From Civil Society to Global Civil Society
Civil society as a concept has evolved considerably over the years. Aristotle, to start,
viewed civil society as indistinguishable from the modern concept of the state, where a social
contract binds everyone to equal treatment under the law.42 The modern conception of civil
society, however, is said to have come from Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, who was struck
curious as to why a Marxist revolution was possible in Russia and not Italy.43 Civil society, he
figured, was the answer. He wrote in one of his notebooks that “In the East, the state was
everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation
between state and civil society, and when the state trembled a sturdy structure of civil society
was immediately revealed.”44 Mary Kaldor defines civil society as “the process through which
individuals negotiate, argue, struggle against or agree with each other and with the centres of
political and economic authority.”45 Thus today, entities such as nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and the social movement organizations (SMOs) examined in this project constitute civil
society.
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The idea of a “global” civil society came about in the 1970s, and has become associated
with the struggle to counteract the influence of totalitarian states. Håkan Thörn provides a
definition of global civil society that is especially attuned to the business of this project, where I
am attempting to discern the forces engaged within the ostensibly nebulous realm of “public
discourse” that serve to determine the fate of social movements. “[G]lobal civil society”
according to Thörn,
is a political space in which a diversity of political cultures interact and intersect.
‘Political culture’ refers to processes of communication and articulation of political
experiences, action strategies, identities, values, norms and rules – and to the institutions
in which these processes are embedded.46
Thus, the “islands of civic engagement” where SMOs arise, as I suggested in the introduction,
are the places where elements of one region’s political culture appears to align with another
region’s political culture, and ultimately create a sense of solidarity, leading to the feeling of
cognitive liberation necessary to mobilize a social movement; where cognitive liberation is
defined as the “perceived probability of making a difference.”47 Then, civil society forges links
between groups across the world who are keen to use international human rights legislation to
pressure their governments into legislating in favor of foreign policy designed to use diplomatic
means to change the behavior of states in question.48 So the social movements treated in this
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project are both SMOs created as a result of global civil society, where islands of civic
engagement were established in the U.S.—one successfully, the anti-apartheid movement, the
other, the pro-Palestinian movement, that continues to struggle. The question of this project is
thus, in a way Gramsican. What differences present in the social movements examined account
for the success of one over the failure of another? Instead of civil society being the central
distinguishing factor in this question, it is rather the social movements themselves. There is a
degree of controversy surrounding the concept of global civil society

Habermas’s Theory of Deliberative Democracy and Noelle-Neumann’s Spiral of Silence
Theory
Thus, civil society represents an area of society that is integrated within the ordinary
population. German sociologist Jürgen Habermas provides more detail surrounding the question
of distinguishing the discursive climates present when thinking in terms of networks of
communication. The logic that leads toward thinking of society in these terms could be said to
have been established in his 1962 book Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse
Theory of Law and Democracy, where he endeavored to apply his discourse theory to the realm
of law and democracy. In doing so, Habermas puts forth his own normative theory of
deliberative democracy.49 His idea of deliberative democracy is based upon a broader attitude
toward the function that the act of communication serves. For Habermas, non-strategic
communication functions as the means by which progress occurs in society, as it facilitates a
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mindset that is geared toward the ultimate rationalization of the topic being discussed. He
applies this theory to an article he writes in 2006 “Political Communication in Media Society:
Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on
Empirical Research” in which he argues that there is indeed an “epistemic dimension for the
democratic procedures of legitimation.”50 In order to do so, he references case studies that prove
face-to-face public discourse facilitates empathy, in the sense that through communicating with
those with whom you disagree, one is able to ascertain the context out of which opposing views
emerge. Furthermore, Habermas emphasizes the reality that liberal democratic institutions in the
modern era were actually designed so as to facilitate this kind of communication, for its “truth
tracking potential”51 that facilitates the democratic process. Calling for the “independence of a
public sphere that operates as an intermediary system between state and society,”52 Habermas
presents his “communication model of deliberative politics”53 demonstrating that
[m]ediated political communication in the public sphere can facilitate deliberative
legitimation processes in complex societies only if a self-regulating media system gains
independence from its social environments, and if anonymous audiences grant feedback
between an informed elite discourse and a responsive civil society.54
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Therefore, Habermas conceives of his communication model’s value in terms of its
“epistemic function of discourse and negotiation than in rational choice or political ethos.”55
This is the same way securitization theory treats meaning; public opinion in a communication
model is thought to recondition itself through the act of communication.56 Ideally, public
opinion is shaped by deliberation among individuals in the public sphere, face-to-face. This type
of discourse precludes the use of strategy or manipulation to achieve individual goals. In effect,
this generates a “social space” 57 where actors engage in a face-to-face conversation and “take a
second-person attitude, reciprocally attributing communicative freedom to each other.”58
Individuals leave such an interaction with a greater understanding of a topic, and the perspective
to empathize with those with opposing views. For this reason, deliberation is considered “an
essential element to the democratic process, and as such is precisely the task of the public sphere.
Habermas indicates the three functions deliberation should theoretically fulfill in a democratic
system: “to mobilize and pool relevant issues and required information, and to specify
interpretations to process such contributions discursively by means of proper arguments for and
against; and to generate rationally motivated yes or no attitudes that are expected to determine
the outcome of procedurally correct decisions.”59 The public sphere is thus the sphere in which
civil society is found, where individuals can potentially mobilize around certain issues that have
been commonly ascertained and find ways to make the changes in government necessary to
address those issues. This can take place domestically or it can take place in a global civil
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society within a broader global public sphere, where SMOs and NGOs are able to capitalize upon
international law in order to penetrate the political public sphere.
Situated at the center of the communication network, the political public sphere generates
through its own institutionalized deliberation processes “legislative decisions and political
programs, rulings or verdicts, administrative measures and decrees, guidelines, policies.”60 The
politicians and media professionals that report on them are considered “both the coauthors and
the addressees of public opinions,”61 and accordingly enjoy a substantial degree of influence.
However, while politicians may use this influence to gain political power, they can only exercise
that power through “institutionalized procedures.”62 While the privilege of being able to access
the media used to be restricted to the political elite (fitting with the realist logic of securitization
theory), Habermas indicates five additional types of actors that appear in mass media, who
alternatively may abuse their influence: lobbyists, advocates, experts, “moral entrepreneurs,”
calling attention to under-reported issues, and intellectuals.”63
Thus, Habermas conceives of one’s capacity to derive meaning as being limited to one’s
context or lifeworld, whether located among the many contexts of the public sphere or the
political public sphere. This concept relates to the phenomenon I argue has manifested as a
result of the success of the Israel lobby’s wide range of appeal, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann’s
concept of the spiral of silence. She makes note of the reality that while there is a concept of
public opinion that “carries a critical connotation” and is “founded on rational discussion”
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indicative of Habermas’s idea of the kind of deliberative communication in the public sphere that
serves to regulate and improve upon our political systems, there is also a “second meaning,
which is older, [and] connotes pressure to conform.”64 For Noelle-Neumann, this second
meaning is evocative of her theory of the spiral of silence, for which she identifies four central
theses; that a) “[a]s social beings, most people are afraid of becoming isolated from their
environment;” b) “[i]n order to avoid becoming isolated and in order not to lose popularity and
esteem, people constantly observe their environment very closely” and act accordingly; c) “[w]e
can distinguish between fields where the opinions and attitudes involved are static, and fields
where those opinions and attitudes are subject to changes;” and d) “[i]ndividuals who, when
observing their environments, notice their own personal opinion is spreading and is taken over
by others, will voice this opinion self-confidently in public. On the other hand, individuals who
notice that their own opinions are losing ground, will be inclined to adopt a more reserved
attitude when expressing their opinions in public.”65 Moreover, Noelle-Neumann explains the
logic behind her concept of the spiral of silence as a social psychological mechanism, indicating
[t]hat, as the representatives of the first opinion talk quite a lot while the representatives
of the second opinion remain silent, there is a definite influence on the environment: An
opinion that is being reinforced in this way appears stronger than it really is, while an
opinion suppressed as described will seem to be weaker than it is in reality. The result is
a spiral process which prompts other individuals to perceive the changes in opinion and
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to follow suit, until one opinion will be pushed back and rejected by everybody with the
exception of the hard core that nevertheless sticks to that opinion.66
I argue this phenomenon has manifested in U.S. society as Israel continues to occupy a
privileged status in regards to media access and the acknowledges the likelihood of the public
embracing whatever is said as true. Thus, one of the most critical elements to consider when
thinking about networks of communication is the role a self-regulating media system plays in
creating dynamics like the spiral of silence. While a view may already be in the process of being
silenced by a more dominant view in a spiral of silence, access to the media will only reinforce
the process, especially in cases where media corporations stand to gain from giving more airtime
to one view over another. In that case, “concentrated efforts to translate economic power to
political influence can be seen to have a measurable effect.”67 Moreover, even without such an
incentive, some groups with already dominant views may enjoy privileged access to appear in
media. This privilege arguably is able to be counteracted in the age of the internet, but with
views that have already been so institutionalized, such as that regarding the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict in the U.S., it is difficult to imagine the internet providing any discernable advantage for
pro-Palestinian groups. It is more likely that the internet works in a different way, where
discourse is given the appearance of being balanced, where in reality, while the less dominant
view may be expressed, it is still disadvantaged in terms of access to the means to influence the
political public sphere. The implications of such a scenario for a social movement may be its
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alienation from society. In the next section, I discuss the broader social movement theory in
which status in a communication network is equivalent correlates to political opportunity.
Social Movement Theory
As early as the 1920s, a group of sociologists came to approach the analytical treatment
of social movements in terms of “collective behavior” which became a specialized field within
sociology developed by the “Chicago school.68 In much the same way the Copenhagen school
considers securitization to occur due to a discursive legitimation process, the school of collective
behavior today studies “the transformation of institutional behaviors through the action of
emergent normative definitions.”69 So, both securitization theorists and sociologists studying
collective behavior utilize Jürgen Habermas’ theoretical framework of communication networks.
Where collective behavior is concerned, however, the theory is doubly applicable due to its basis
around the understanding that new norms “appear when the traditional normative structure
comes into conflict with a continually evolving situation.”70 Habermas considers engagement
with public discourse to be dialectical in nature, which suggests that the “continually evolving
situation” mentioned could potentially be understood as a reference to public discourse as it
evolves over time.
Unfortunately, much of the research conducted on social movements throughout the 20th
century was not as forward thinking. Sociologists contributed toward the development of
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stereotypes surrounding those who participated in protests, casting them as people engaged in
deviant behavior.71 The theory of relative deprivation rationalized that individuals may have
been driven to protest as a response to “some form of structural strain” (be it industrialization,
urbanization, unemployment) that produced “subjective tension and therefore the psychological
disposition to engage in extreme behaviours such as panics, mobs etc. to escape from these
tensions.”72 Mass society theory was conceived similarly, as participants in movements were
considered to come from isolated backgrounds with no tangible resources or prospects.73
It was not until the 1960s that this view of activists was challenged, when a new model of
social movement theory emerged: resource mobilization theory. While analysts had sought until
then to theorize the existence of individual participants in social movements, they never managed
to get close enough to them to glean their experience. However, the wave of movements
occurring at that time raised the opportunity to topple the status quo in social movement theory,
when some activists invited “an enlarged pool of analysts” to experience what it was really like
to participate in a social movement. While beforehand social movement theorists may have
imagined social movements to consist of but a few disorganized “transitory discontents;”74 they
were able to return with radically changed perspectives on social movement theory. Therefore,
analysts established resource mobilization theory, which highlighted the “continuities between
movement and institutionalized actions, the rationality of movement actors, the strategic
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problems confronted by movements, and the role of movements as agencies for social change.”75
Most importantly, they came away with the view that “grievances generated by [conflicts of
interest] are sufficiently ubiquitous that the formation and mobilization of movements depend on
changes in resources, group organization, and opportunities for collective action,” and “the
success of social movements is largely determined by strategic factors and the political factors in
which they become enmeshed.”76 Whereas traditional theorists conceived of social movements
as “extensions of more elementary forms of collective behavior,” resource mobilization theorists
see social movements as ”extensions of institutionalized actions” limiting their focus to affecting
institutional change.77 Moreover, Thörn goes as far as to assert that the social movements
occurring in the 1960s “contributed to the emergence of a new global political space.”78 This
new space would come to be characterized in large part by its “information politics” which
included “carefully thought-out strategies of public information that provided a solid base for the
[anti-apartheid] movement’s various public communication strategies.”79

The debut of resource mobilization theory cleared the way for political process theory to
do so accordingly in the late 1970s. On the surface, the two theories would actually appear quite
similar. For one, both consider social movements to be a political phenomenon,80 contrary to the
belief of early theorists, who sought to uncover the pathologies that led people to ostensibly
extricate themselves from society as they knew them and become deviants. Another similarity
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shared among the two theories is that they are both based upon a common view of the American
political system, where it is given that wealth is to be concentrated in the hands of a few,
precluding most of the population from ever imagining that they could exert influence over their
own lives.81 Political process theory takes this to indicate how it makes sense that marginalized
groups form social movements, because they otherwise would lack the influence necessary to
sustain a politician’s attention long enough to reach a goal. On the other hand, proponents of
resource mobilization of course recognize the magnitude of the wealth gap; instead of
fundraising as they do to help alleviate the burden placed upon disenfranchised people, they raise
funds among one another in order to afford things too expensive for one person to buy, but the
collective nevertheless would desire and value.
For the purposes of this project, then, I have chosen to use political process theory. I
favor this approach over the others, not only due to the others’ inadequacies, but also due to its
emphasis on social movement organizations (SMOs) as institutions of civil society that must
navigate politics in order to hope to change them. For, it is unlikely that social movements
operating within relatively stable liberal democracies would ever find themselves in the position
to radically overthrow the government, or otherwise embody the old-fashioned activist
stereotype as movements motivated solely by individual feelings of deprivation. McAdam
speaks to the same dynamic, in his Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency,
where he writes that “the political process model is based on the notion that political action by
established polity members reflects an abiding conservatism. . . encourage[ing] polity members
to "resist changes which would threaten their current realization of their interests even more than
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they seek changes which would enhance their interests."82 In conjunction with this general
mindset, there are characteristics that various social movement theorists have identified as
important. Tilly, for instance, pays particular attention to a movement’s “action repertoire,” or,
in other words, the varying strategies its members employ, depending on “spatial and temporal
locations,”83 and otherwise determined by the “structural variables” and “cultural context in
which they originate.”84 Moreover, I agree with McAdam’s particular fashioning of the theory to
include the fundamental factors crucial to mobilize a social movement: a) the structure of
political opportunity, organizational structure, and the level cognitive liberation within the
movement.85 McAdam conceives of political opportunity as “any event or broad social process
that serves to undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is
structured.”86 Organizational structure involves factors including the degree to which an
“indigenous” organizational structure existed, the membership and communication network that
entails, and/or the ability to co-opt established communication networks. Cognitive liberation
involves the natural changes in consciousness experienced by members of a collective. First, the
perceived “system” loses legitimacy. Individuals might typically accept the authority of leaders
and “the legitimacy of institutional arrangements” however once placed among a collective,
individuals may begin to consider arrangements unjustified. Second, whereas individuals on
their own may accept their condition as inevitable, once in a group they begin to demand change.
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Lastly, individuals may consider themselves helpless on their own, but once in a group, gather
the requisite courage to take charge of their fate.87 A
Sociological Theories as Mechanisms of Securitization
In the next chapter, I set out to apply this theoretical framework to the analysis of the
cases in this project. I compare the mainstream institutional aspect of each case, will involve an
interrogation of the network of communication that existed between South Africa and the U.S. in
the apartheid era, specifically in the time directly preceding U.S. Congress passing the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. By examining the behavior of South African
lobbies, I am able to ascertain the ways in which their appeal was limited to a specific
constituency of conservative Americans. Strategies employed by lobbies included attempts to
convince Americans that black South Africans would suffer if sanctions led companies to
downsize.
I contrast the ultimate failure of South African lobbies to prevent a formal condemnation
of the apartheid regime with Israel’s success in institutionalizing favorable political discourse
and, accordingly, a spiral of silence surrounding Israeli security policy. To do so, I first examine
the ways in which Israeli state-building strategies contributed toward forming Israeli national
identity. These strategies included the obfuscation of Palestinian historical ties to the contested
region, which I demonstrate by discussing the ways in which Israeli government institutions
influenced Israeli public discourse, including the passing of legislation that restricted schools’
freedom to teach subjects like geography as they saw fit, as well as right-wing religious lobbies’
87
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adoption of expansionist rhetoric in order to broaden their appeal among the Israeli population.
Moreover, I discuss the Israeli defense establishment and the way in which compulsory military
service has led to less criticism of the human rights implications of Israeli security policy. Then,
I discuss the ways in which pro-Israel lobbies in the United States have established a broad base
of support in the U.S. that involves both Jews and other constituencies likely to support
expansionism or institution of hawkish military policy in the Middle East. I conclude that the
cumulative effect of these efforts has led to a spiral of silence among U.S. constituencies that
would normally oppose a right-wing view toward security policy.
I then deal with the social movements involved in each case, and the ways in which they
have either taken advantage of political opportunity to build significant coalitions of support, or
been disenfranchised by an inability to do so. In the case of the anti-apartheid movement, I
discuss how organizations were able to take advantage of mass media institutions in order to
promote visibility of the movement, televising acts of civil disobedience, protests, incidents of
police brutality; gaining sympathy from journalists deemed sympathetic to the movement,
writing letters to the editor and producing informational material for journalists.88 In the case of
my analysis of the pro-Palestinian movement, I indicate how the disenfranchised position of
Palestinians in large part precludes their ability to communicate the magnitude of their situation
to the international community via a lack of access to relate their experiences in their own terms
on mainstream media platforms.
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Chapter Three: Applications to the Anti-Apartheid Struggle and the Pro-Palestinian
Movement

According to Habermas, modern democracies are designed to guarantee “the
independence of a public sphere that operates as an intermediary system between state and
society.” 89 Furthermore,

[t]he design is to guarantee… an appropriate contribution of a political public sphere to
the formation of considered public opinions through… communication and association
rights and a regulation of the power structure of the public sphere securing the diversity
of independent mass media, and a general access of inclusive mass audiences to the
public sphere.90

To the extent possible, then, public opinion ought to be trusted as a representation of
political reality. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, one’s potential to derive rational
opinions from communication will always depend upon one’s context in the broader
communication network. Indeed, structural inequalities are inherent in a self-regulating media
society, causing discursive patterns like the spiral of silence that distort meaning, and inevitably
inhibit one’s ability to form fully rational opinions. Nonetheless, people hold fast to their
opinions, and oftentimes take pride in them as manifestations of their core values. Social
movement theory indicates be the source of the cognitive liberation necessary to mobilize social
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movements, and similarly, interest groups and lobbies. How do opinions become so entrenched
and normalized?

I seek to demonstrate the conditions that, over time, contribute toward a spiral of silence,
that further entrenches personal opinions, entangling them with identity and culture such that
they eventually are rendered untouchable by deliberative communication. In terms of the
political process model, I evaluate the differences between the dominant and repressed forces
involved in a spiral of silence. I begin with a discussion of the various strategies by which the
South African government as well as South African businesses lobbied against U.S. divestment
and sanctions. Then, I contrast the limited scope of such efforts to the comprehensive approach
of the American pro-Israel Lobby. To be sure, I am not going so far as to label the discursive
relationship between the anti-apartheid movement and the South African lobbyists as
constituting a spiral of silence of similar magnitude.

The South African Effort to Lobby the U.S. Government and the American People

Toward the late 1970s, it became increasingly clear that if the South African apartheid regime
were to at least ensure its continued “constructive engagement” with the Reagan Administration,
it would have to adopt new means to influence the Americans.91 It would have to attempt to
appeal to those ideologically opposed to apartheid, in order to at least end apartheid on the
Afrikaaner government’s own terms. Thus, South Africa invested heavily in efforts to gain
influence in the U.S., allegedly hiring upwards of fifteen lobbying and public relations firms

91

Sanford J. Ungar. “SOUTH AFRICA’S LOBBYISTS.” The New York Times. October 12, 1985
38

throughout the 1980s to promote South African policies and provide “South African officials
with government, business and media contacts” that would help “shape and target South African
propaganda for maximum impact.”92 In particular, the South African government paid
Republican lobbyists to introduce South African dignitaries to influential Washingtonians, assist
in writing the South African ambassador’s speeches and articles, and represent the South African
Consul General in Chicago to address a lease dispute. On the other hand, the South African
government paid Democratic lobbyists to take special care to inform South Africa of legislation
that may affect relations. Further, the apartheid regime pressed lobbyists to convince
Congressmen that the U.S. ought to invest more in South Africa in order to provide incentive for
social change in the country.93

The South African government additionally paid lobbying firm Bill Hecht and Associates
to represent the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information “to improve the
image of South Africa… and to encourage a balanced and fair assessment of the situations.”94 In
addition, Bill Hecht and Associates advised the South African Embassy, hiring consultants to
help improve South Africa’s image among black Americans and conservative groups.95 The
South African Embassy also targeted American Jews in its attempt to prevent sanctions,
particularly invoking the reality that South Africa remained one of Israel’s allies.96
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The South Africa Foundation’s PR efforts were perhaps the most extensive. The
foundation recruited representatives to travel the country on speaking tours, hoping to convince
the American public eventually to oppose sanctions. The Foundation also sent South African
academics and businessmen to state their case, as well as unusually successful black South
Africans, which Americans perceived as particularly pathetic.97 Defenders of apartheid
specifically sought to communicate that the U.S. was naïve to believe that if the black majority
were to achieve proportional representation in government that they would embrace democracy.
Rather, it was portrayed as more likely that the “alternative to white rule [would be] a Sovietinfluenced, or outright Communist regime.”98 Instead of divesting, then, defenders of apartheid
urged the West to “increase its stake in the South African economy, close economic and cultural
gaps and promote the creation of a larger, capitalist oriented black middle class.”99

While the Conservative Caucus and the right-wing religious organization the Moral
Majority continued to oppose sanctions, even Republicans eventually began taking tougher
positions toward the apartheid regime, despite all of South Africa’s PR efforts. In October 1986,
The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (H.R. 4868) became Public Law 99-440.
Despite President Reagan’s attempt to veto the law, it passed the House 313-83 and the Senate
78-21. So without regard to the success of the anti-apartheid movement, why did South Africa’s
efforts to influence American public opinion ultimately fail? To begin, the window of political
opportunity for the South African government was decidedly narrow. The only possible
opportunities for the apartheid government to attempt to appeal to American values was to either
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a) rally the support of white supremacists; b) pursue religious fundamentalists; c) appeal to the
fears of the business elite; d) invoke the threat of Communism; or e) promote the possibility that
economic sanctions would only serve to harm the black population. Now, taken together, these
possibilities do not translate considerably across the political spectrum. For the most part, these
points may only have seemed threatening toward those Americans with political views rightwing enough at the time to disregard the plight of the majority black population in South Africa
as a factor worthy of consideration when it came to whether to support sanctions or otherwise.
There was no deeper identity issue at stake for the vast majority of white Americans, so anything
that the Afrikaaners could have said negatively about the black population would immediately be
revealed a shallow attempts to manipulate American public opinion to revive their policy goals.
In addition, there was no opportunity for the apartheid regime to attempt to silence the
Americans as not knowing what they were talking about, because the civil rights movement still
persisted in recent memory. There were no missed opportunities to be had for the apartheid
regime—to return to the securitization framework, there was only a negligible audience for the
securitization, so any securitizing move made on behalf of the South African government was
made in vain. Lack of any audience or basis values significant to the majority of the American
population diminished any capacity there may have been to crate communication networks
among followers, there was no chance that islands of civic engagement might arise either in
favor of white supremacy or anti-Communism.

Origins of Limited Israeli Discourse

41

In stark contrast to the case of the South African government’s attempt to lobby the
Americans, there is the Israel Lobby in the U.S.. The concept of the Israel Lobby refers to the all
of the pro-Israel forces in America taken cumulatively (not to any single lobby). The most
prominent pro-Israel lobby in the U.S. is the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC). Even before considering the activities of the Israel Lobby within the United States or
with consideration to the United States, it is necessary to look back toward the State of Israel
itself. Part of what I argue has contributed toward the spiral of silence surrounding American
public discourse on Israel is a product of what has been required of Israeli state-building
processes. Namely, I refer to the predominance of Israel’s Security Network, which Oren Barak
and Gabriel Sheffer claim “has been critically involved in the political, social, economic and
cultural spheres” and “is made up of actors who (a) are connected by informal, nonhierarchical
ties; (b) share common values and perceptions regarding Israel’s security and the ways to
promote it; (c) have identical or similar individual and collective interests; and (d) are capable of
joining hands to influence policymaking on different levels and in various spheres of the
country’s public life.”100 Moreover, Israel’s Security Network is described as involving “the
institutionalization of beliefs, values, cultures, and particular forms of behavior” such that the
policy process is streamlined by “limiting actions, problems and solutions.”101 I view this
concept to be analogous to Habermas’s communication model, where context necessarily limits
one’s potential to arrive at rational conclusions through deliberative communication. Barak and
Sheffer argue that “it is the continued existence of Israel’s Security Network, especially since
1967, which has hindered the emergence of more differentiated civilian and military spheres”
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within Israel. Most relevant to this project is how Israel’s Security Network has influenced
public discourse on national security, through its strict control of the country’s education
policies, military censorship, journalism that is generally considered restrained, and nonetheless
reflects the views of the DE.102

The tradition of the DE being deeply ideological and involved in determining state policy
stems from the nature of the 1948 war, where Israeli militias were organized according to
political institutions.103 The fact that the war ended in Armistice Agreements led Israel to
conceive of itself as facing continuous existential threat and thus ensured the future dominance
of military industries. The reality of mandatory military service combined with a relatively
young retirement age means that many retired military officers go on to work in civilian sectors,
but nonetheless continue to remain loyal to the DE. What is perhaps most crucial, though, is that
the civil society movements that do exist in Israel have had to do with national security and have
served not only to indoctrinate young people, but to further securitize public discourse.104

Another way in which Israeli state building has disrupted public discourse is through its
cartography practices, as Christine Leuenberger and Izhak Schnell explain in their
comprehensive study of the ways in which the rhetorical power of maps helped legitimize Israeli
“secular expansionism” advocated by the Likud Party.105 By legislating against the use of
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unofficial maps in schools, this further limits the ability of the public sphere to act as an
“intermediary” between the state and society.

Comparing the Pro-Palestinian Movement to the Anti-Apartheid Movement

Thus, when Israeli security policy becomes a topic of discussion in the U.S., an already restricted
conversation becomes even more limited, in part because of Israel’s monopoly over the
representation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the media. Because of the restrictions that
exist for Palestinians and those who travel in the Occupied Territories, filming the actions of the
Israeli Defense Forces is nearly impossible. Therefore, Palestinians have very limited means to
communicate on their own terms with islands of civic engagement that may exist around the
world. On the other hand, organizations like the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF)
made informational material about apartheid accessible,and was able to build a “large archive of
films and photographs related to South Africa and the anti-apartheid struggle.”106
Anti-apartheid movement activists succeeded in part because of their ability to “systematically
[develop] activist networks into informational networks” 107 When information is so limited, it is
difficult to maintain the cognitive liberation necessary to mobilize the actions of social
movements. The more Israel uses mass media to publish its narrative, the more likely it is that
Palestinian attempts to mobilize solidarity will be seen as an existential threat to the Israeli state,
due to the fact that the conflict has been framed in those terms by both sides for so long.

106
107

Ibid., 908.
Ibid., 907.
44

Another area where the pro-Palestinian movement is deficient in comparison to the
pervasiveness of the Israeli narrative is a means to identify in terms of cultural values. The fact
that, ostensibly, at least, Americans seem to share a common sense of liberal democratic
ideology with the Israelis, and that makes us more likely to empathize with them over an under
represented society that is characterized as radical and to share little in common in terms of
cultural affinities, like music and dance.

In contrast, to the failures of the pro-Palestinian movement, I present the ways in which the AntiApartheid movement was able to thrive. Firstly, the African National Congress developed a
conscious media politics. Indeed, Thörn argues “that the emerging global success of the ANC…
was partly due to the fact that it - and the organizations that were working closely with it – came
to understand the importance of media work.”108 While the movement took advantage of global
media industries to attract the attention necessary to spread their ant-apartheid message, the
movement was also able to develop its own independent media platforms, thereby creating “an
alternative public sphere that would make it possible to address publics directly, thus freeing the
movement from any dependence on global media industries.”109
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